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I. Basic Concepts: War, Strategy, Power:
The focus of this symposium is on strategic matters. My 
task in this initial presentation deals with the ratios of power 
in the contemporary world. That word, power, occurs frequently 
in the discussion of international affairs. Its meaning is not an 
obvious one, nor are the meanings of most of the other terms 
which predominate in the discussion of international affairs 
obvious. I think it advisable, therefore, to clarify some of the 
basic terms pertinent to the topic.
War is definable as a contest of purpose between two sides 
consisting of groups which are states, or at least aspire to 
act like states. To the extent of exercising exclusive control over 
a segment of territory, the two sides dispose armed forces. 
They seek, each to its own advantage, to prevail in the contest 
of purpose by bringing about a radical redress in relative capa­
city and will for bringing force to bear. To that end they must 
actually transm it energy and discharge it destructively against 
each other’s establishments.
From that simple definition, we can derive many in ter­
acting dimensions which determine whether wars are relatively 
larger or smaller. In this connection I wish to avoid the phrase 
limited war. It seems to me to be a misleading phrase. No war 
is infinite. All wars are limited. What is significant is the 
question of the respects in which a particular war is enlarged 
or constricted. How many participants are there? What pur­
poses are put at issue as war aims? How far do the antagonists 
go in generating energy and in producing organization and 
paraphernalia for transm itting such energy and expending it 
against the adversary with destructive effect — that is to say, 
to what level do they mobilize? How much energy is employed 
destructively? Over how wide an area? How intensively? How 
long is the effort persevered in? How great is the havoc 
wrought? These questions indicate the various interacting 
dimensions of war, and I should stress that the interactions,
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depending on particular circumstances, may be expansive or 
constrictive.
I take note also of various categories of warfare encom­
passed by the definition I have given. Wars may be distinguish­
ed, one from another, with respect to the relation between 
the territorial bases and perim eters claimed by the contending 
sides. If they are mutually exclusive, the war concerned is 
unequivocally an international war. If they coincide, or if the 
territorial base asserted by one encompasses the base asserted 
by the other, the war is unequivocally an internal war. In parti­
cular cases, wars may be of mixed characteristics in this respect. 
The question of whether a war is to be regarded as internal or 
international may express the central issue at stake between 
the contending sides. Another point of distinction relates to the 
extent to which the antagonists are disposed or are able to 
conform to the usages generally followed by well developed 
states engaged in war. How explicit are their boundaries, es­
pecially in the consciousness of the inhabitants who dwell on 
one side or the other of the demarcation lines? How far are 
their armed forces professionalized — that is to say, dis­
tinguished by vocation and dress from the general public? 
To what extent do the antagonists have formal means of an­
nouncing policies and issuing edicts? With respect to such 
m atters as these, wars may be differentiated as conventional 
or unconventional.
I wish to proceed now to consider the meaning of strategy 
and the cognate word strategic. As a point of convenience for 
clarification I ask you to take account of the meaning of the 
word weapon. A weapon is an instrum ent used at the last stage 
of a perhaps complex series of stages involved in the process 
of generating and transm itting energy, and, finally, bringing 
it to bear destructively on an enemy establishment. That is 
to say, a weapon is an instrum ent used in the final stage of 
discharging force on a target in combat. When we focus nar­
rowly on the junctures where weapons are used in warfare, our 
perspective is tactical. When, in contrast, we adopt a perspective 
in which we seek to see the whole set of relations among the 
m aterial factors and between them and the myriad less con­
crete factors which bear upon war, our perspective is stra­
tegic. Strategy encompasses the great array of what I have 
called the interacting dimensions of war. What are the war
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aims? How do they relate to the question of who shall be drawn 
in as participants, and vice versa? How will these m atters 
affect the scope, intensity, and duration of the conflict? How, 
in reverse, will these m atters affect the issues put at stake? 
And so on, through a complex of inter-relations. These are the 
constituents of strategy, which encompass all of the military 
aspects of war but is by no means limited to them.
One more distinction between tactics and strategy is worth 
mentioning. Tactical considerations relate to combat. Strategic 
concepts are continuously active, whether or not war is actually 
being engaged in. Every government must, to some extent, be 
continuously involved in the calculus of conceptual war, even 
at times when formal peace obtains. In his interesting small 
book called War in the Modern Age, Sir Keith Hancock 
stresses the understanding of war and peace as continuous 
processes unremittingly exacting attention, resources, and moral 
concern from those who govern. He tells us that they are not 
properly to be considered as successive and mutually exclusive 
segments of experience. He regards them as interactive and 
complementary endeavors which must be pursued in the life 
of states. How much of moral concern and of m aterial resources 
must be portioned to the uses of civil enjoyment? How much 
must be diverted to those uses which are designed to intimidate 
and deter potential enemies and, as a corollary, to generate 
confidence in continuity within the state and to give reassurance 
to those abroad who are disposed to stand with it? Even under 
the conditions of peace, statesmanship involves an unremitting 
appraisal of the potential for conflict and of its probable con­
sequences and an appraisal as well of the reciprocal estimates 
made by putative friends and enemies over the great globe. 
These are the continuing constituents of any national strategy. 
Such strategy, if it is adequate, must continuously look to the 
generating and maintenance of material and moral factors to 
assure that such appraisals shall be made with self-confidence.
We come now again to the concept of power. That basic 
term refers to capacity to achieve intended results. In inter­
national affairs it takes on a strategic tone. It rings with impli­
cations relevant to capacity to intimidate putative enemies 
and to reassure potential friends. The constituents of power in 
international affairs do not pertain exclusively to a regime’s 
horizontal relationships with other regimes, nor do they
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pertain exclusively to relationships between a regime and its 
internal base. Rather, the constituents of power encompass both 
frames. More to the point, the elements of power concern con­
tinuous interaction between the internal life of an organized 
society and the vast realm external to it. The relevant factors 
include such concrete m atters as resources, numbers, and 
geographic position. They include the aggregate of talents 
available within the population and such non-material m atters 
as public spirit and general esprit among the people. Other 
constituents pertain to a regim e’s reputation — its prestige, 
its capacity to elicit confidence in its given word, its will and 
its ability to enter into and to keep contracts. A central con­
sideration is always the integrity of the regime’s position in 
relation to the society over which it exerts jurisdiction. Is the 
regime legitimate? Is it such that those who exercise authority 
do so in confidence of their right to do so and in confidence 
that that right is acknowledged by determ ining numbers of 
those over whom they exercise jurisdiction? In contrast, is the 
regime unsure of its title to authority and anxious about its 
tenure and its standing with its people? Those and such con­
siderations are integral to the quotients of power in interna­
tional affairs.
The elements of power are so basic to the life of states 
that the term for the attribute is often applied to the entity; 
states are often called powers. Those considered to be capable 
of exerting influence widely beyond their own spans of ju ris­
diction are referred  to as great powers, and great powers 
regarded as of prime magnitude are often called super powers. 
I urge that we apply caution in employing these terms. The 
role of a great power or a super power is not simply that of 
exercising influence over a wide span. It is also that of being 
looked to expectantly and of continuously being pressed by 
others into the assumption of obligations on their behalf. It 
is so easy to infer that the career of a great power is that of 
pushing others this way or that and to forget that the role 
is also a good deal of being pulled this way and that by others. 
As a companion point, it is so easy to infer that a so-called 
great power disposes illimitable efficacy and that whatever 
may be unsatisfactory in the world situation is accordingly 
due to a default of policy on the part of a great power. I 
urge upon you the thought that even a so-called great power
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does not have power to ordain and to control affairs beyond 
the span of its own jurisdiction.
A year or so ago I spent a long evening discussing foreign 
policy with a highly select and manifestly capable group of 
young persons in my own country. At the outset they all 
agreed, when one of them uttered an aphorism about the need 
for the United States to eschew the role of a global policeman. 
My comment to them was that such an aphorism — an editoral 
w riter’s phrase ra ther than a policy m aker’s phrase — never 
really settles any issue. As the evening progressed, however, 
the participants pressed a series of questions such as why the 
United States had permitted the Greek colonels to overturn 
Greece’s so-called democracy, why the United States had not 
headed off the 1967 war between Israel and its neighbors, and 
why the United States did not put its foot down and enforce 
a settlem ent of the Kashmir issue, race problems in Southern 
Africa, and so on. By tone and implication, the United States 
had complete foresight and untrammeled authority in world 
affairs. I pointed out to that audience that if the United States 
really had such omniscience and omnicompetence, then it would 
have no right not to be the world’s policeman. I reminded them 
of the simple and self evident circumstance that, for any 
government, including my own, foreign policy pertains to those 
m atters which by definition lie beyond the span of its juris­
diction.
Since coming to South Africa on this third visit, I have 
several times encountered similar suppositions about American 
power in the world. Only a few weeks ago a South African 
reproachfully asked me why the United States had not long 
ago laid down the law with respect to affairs within China. 
Twenty years ago, he contended, the United States should have 
formulated and given effect to a solution of the China problem, 
thereby avoiding a store of trouble for itself. I pointed to the 
vastness and complexity of the problem and to the modesty 
of American purchase on the situation. He retorted that my 
country disposed illimitable power and that it would have 
achieved any result that it wished if only it had had a mind 
to do so. Ten minutes further along in the discussion the focus 
was on Rhodesia. My friend asked me why the United States 
did not come to its senses regarding Rhodesia’s autonomy. He 
added that there was no possibility of bringing about a col­
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lapse of the regime there so long as it continued to enjoy South 
Africa’s support. Taking my cue from what had been said 
about China, I retorted with a suggestion that the United States 
might issue South Africa a demand for a change of front. In 
retort my friend expostulated that South Africa was an inde­
pendent and autonomous country far beyond reach of American 
fiat. He abandoned all the premises he had invoked only a 
few minutes before.
II. Shift and polarization of pow er re la tions
Here, however, I am getting ahead of my account. I am 
discussing the ratios of power in the contemporary world with­
out having first examined the antecedent circumstances. Until 
very recently a basic circumstance in world affairs was the 
pre-eminence of Europe. It would be more accurate to say that 
certain countries or nations of Europe were ascendant in world 
affairs, for Europe is a general region ra ther than being itself 
an actor on the world stage. That region, consisting of two 
compound peninsulas at the northwest extreme of the great 
land mass of the eastern hemisphere along with the nearby 
British Isles, was the location from which radiated the energies 
and impulses by which the whole globe was drawn into one 
span of cognition in a great historic process beginning about 
five centuries ago. Conceivably, some other region might have 
been the hub of the great outward movement which encompas­
sed the globe, but in fact the hub was Europe. Where the 
American nation’s Declaration of Independence asserts a claim 
to a “rightful station among the powers of the earth”, it ex­
presses a purpose to overthrow subordination and to enter into 
the scheme of diplomacy on a parity with the governments of 
Europe, where the powers of the earth were then located. 
Europe’s heyday came in the century between Waterloo and 
Sarajevo. The nations then dominant in world affairs drew 
upon a common fund of history. They shared a universe of 
discourse — meaning not merely that they understood each 
other’s languages, but also that in a broad sense they shared 
a common view of the nature of reality. The leading states of 
Europe were then roughly of the same magnitude. Their govern­
ments had come at last to accept a hands-off principle with 
respect to each other’s internal affairs. The appeal of ideology
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was at a low point. That is to say, none of the world leaders was 
then trying to coerce any of the others into compliance with 
some purported universal scheme for the future. Their wars, 
fought for modest stakes, were relatively infrequent, brief, and 
not very destructive. Great Britain, exercising naval pre-emi­
nence from its offshore position, served as a balancing factor 
among the continental powers.
In retrospect, that period from Waterloo to Sarajevo — a 
period from which many of our assumed norms about world 
affairs, including our standards of diplomatic practice and the 
still enduring notion that peace and order are inherent con­
ditions in world relations and that violence and disorder are 
aberrant — seems almost idyllic. The process of disintegration, 
however, had begun toward the end of the nineteenth century 
and gathered momentum in the early phases of the twentieth. 
One distinguishing circumstance was the loosening of the bonds 
which had held together the multinational imperial states of 
Europe. Another circumstance related to the emergence of 
an integrated German state in central Europe. Its size was dis­
proportionate to the old European balance. Its power was 
enhanced by the dynamic development of ferrous industry in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century. Germany was dis­
posed to challenge Great Britain’s pre-eminence at sea in 
addition to seeking continental pre-eminence. The result was 
the precipitation of two general wars a generation apart.
From the perspective of the present we now understand 
the two World Wars as being two stages of one great historic 
process. In each instance the state of weapon technology had 
an aggravating effect. The wars set in motion proved to be 
beyond the capacity of the European powers themselves to 
bring to resolution. In his book, The Struggle for the Mastery 
of Europe, A. J. P. Taylor emphasizes the importance of the 
winter of 1917 as the juncture when it was manifested that the 
European powers had become incapable of settling their issues 
among themselves. We can say that for the next thirty years — 
that is from 1917 until the immediate sequel to World War II
— the process of registering this circumstance dominated 
world affairs. As of 1910 one would probably have counted 
eight major powers in world affairs — five of them entirely 
within the compass of Europe and a sixth one, namely Russia, 
stretching from eastern Europe across the face of Asia. Forty
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years later the major powers were reduced to two — namely 
Soviet Russia and the United States, the latter located entirely 
beyond the confines of Europe.
The shift in power relations over the world, brought about 
in so brief a period, was enormous. This polarization between 
two positions lying outside the form er center of pre-eminence 
in world affairs had been long foreseen. Baron Stein, a diplomat 
serving Catherine II of Russia in the late eighteenth century, 
was perhaps the first to predict it. Alexis de Toqueville, Hein­
rich Heine, and many others foresaw the development in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century. How basic the change 
in circumstances has been for the United States! It can be 
indicated by one point of reference. In that summer of 1914, 
when the various European governments were going through 
the fateful decisions and responses which would bring on the 
first of the World Wars, none of the governments concerned 
appears to have given a moment’s thought to the question 
of the United State’s possible role in the hostilities then im­
pending. Nothing indicative of awareness of the American 
potential, at least, has come to light from the diplomatic ar­
chives.
III. Other factors of change
How the United States has responsed to the demands 
of a pre-eminent role which has been thrust upon it by cir­
cumstances is a story which I shall not recount in detail 
here. You well know the earlier hopes for achieving on a world­
wide scope, through the agency of a universal organization 
based on the principle of collective security, an order equi­
valent to that which prevailed in the nineteenth century. You 
are aware how, in face of immediate disappointment of that 
hope in the sequel to World War II, the United States engaged 
its energies in fashioning an array of regional alliances in 
pursuance of which it has undertaken strategic commitments 
far and wide over the globe. It is relevant to cite at this point 
some of the concomitant circumstances differentiating the 
contemporary world from the situations obtaining in antece­
dent stages.
A circumstance which comes readily to mind concerns 
the erosion oj the imperial-colonial arrangements through 
which the form er great states of Europe exercised their autho­
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rity over peoples of diverse cultures in positions far removed. 
Those inequalitarian arrangements have vanished wholesale. 
By dozens and dozens form er colonial areas have spun into 
independence and statehood. Many of them now participate 
in the public life of the world without having much of a public 
life of their own. They participate in the making of history 
on the world scene without having any relevant fund of history 
of their own to draw upon. As a result, busybody tendencies 
are encouraged among nations the world over. Governing ap­
paratuses which can scarcely give effect to policies within their 
own realms are tempted to demonstrate their efficacy by 
meddling in m atters beyond their jurisdiction. States which 
have never experienced a free election of their own become 
the insistent exponents of free elections in lands thousands 
of miles away.
Another complicating factor relates to the intensification 
and acceleration of contemporary communications. In a poet’s 
words:-
Gone are the days when madness was confined
By seas and hills from spreading through mankind,
When though a Nero fooled upon a string,
Wisdom still reigned unruffled in Peking.
Americans might well envy the conditions obtaining in an 
earlier phase of the national career when Thomas Jefferson, 
our first Secretary of State, made note that two years had passed 
since any communication had come in from our envoy in Madrid 
and that the m atter might require a looking-into if much more 
time should elapse in silence from that quarter. In our time the 
U.S. Department of State receives about three-quarters of a 
million words of electronic communication from abroad in each 
day of operations. No one mind can begin to m aster it all. 
Proliferation of information is only one aspect of the problem. 
Even more important is the stimulation of artificial exigency. 
Statesmanship must contend everlastingly with the question 
whether problems coming to the fore abroad are inherently 
urgent or are only made to appear urgent because of the 
speeding up of communications. Some problems in world affairs 
are inherently urgent. Questions of that sort may arise in our 
personal lives. When one hunts doves, for example, he must 
learn to respond to stimulus in a moment. If he asks a com­
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mittee to inquire and to report whether the birds aloft really 
are doves, he will have missed his opportunity. In contrast, 
a question of what sort of life insurance to buy or what stocks 
to invest in is one to be answered with m ature deliberation. 
A person who is deliberate in face of questions requiring im­
pulsive answers and quick in coming up with answers to 
problems requiring deliberation is likely to get his life dis­
organized. So it is with governments which cannot distinguish 
between the truly urgent problems and problems only seemingly 
so in world affairs. I have in mind the fatuous speed with 
which the governments, though lacking any real grasp of the 
situation, made up their minds on whether and how to act in 
face of the so-called crisis in the Congo of eight years ago
— a fallacious decision entered into with undue haste under 
the stimulus of modern communications.
A third distinguishing circumstances, as Hannah Arendt says 
in her book, On Revolution, is the rampancy of political ideas 
which echo the French revolution of the eighteenth century. 
One of these, closely identified with secular rationalism, is the 
idea that psychic fulfillment is to be achieved through mass 
political activity. We are supposed to find salvation in temporal 
affairs. Our relationship to the state or to the collectivity is 
supposed to bring us spiritual regeneration. This is an age of 
faith — not of the faith that moves mountains, but of the 
faith that mounts movements. According to a premise widely 
prevailing, all things are made feasible by capturing the center 
of political authority and issuing edicts for whatever may be 
desired. “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will 
be added unto you”, is the way one former political leader on 
the continent of Africa expressed the thought. One of the pro­
minent activists in my country recently declared that he was 
tired of the pursuit of happiness and that it was up to the 
government to capture it and turn it over to him bound.
A closely linked circumstance is the appeal of ideology. I 
mentioned that term before. I said that ideology was at a 
low ebb in international affairs during the nineteenth cen­
tury. At that time it was on the margins of politics. In our 
time it is a central consideration. The ideological approach to 
general affairs has had a power base in international politics 
for more than a half century. By ideology I do not mean simply 
an array of strongly affirmed political beliefs or preferences.
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The term pertains to political purposes which purport to 
rest on a systematic intellectual basis. Ideological beliefs pur­
port to have universal validity. They purport to be an inter­
pretation of all history, to be predictive of an inevitable future, 
and to be exclusively valid for all humanity. Ideological beliefs 
are maintained not as prudential possibilities but as certitudes 
of quasi-religious character. Ideologues are characterized by 
their claims to exclusive legitimacy. All differentiated pur­
poses and all interests which diverge from those maintained by 
the ideological proponents are regarded not merely as rival 
preferences but as deviations from the very laws of reality. 
Despite all that has been said about the mellowing of ideology 
in recent years, we see today the proof of the continuing 
dogmatic thrust of ideology in the events now being reported 
from Czechoslovakia.
Still another differentiating circumstance of great signifi­
cance is the contemporary dynamism of technology. Alfred 
North Whitehead once observed that the invention of invention 
was itself the greatest of all inventions. We see the significance 
of that observation if we interpret invention in a broad sense 
so as to include the tendency in contemporary life, especially 
within the most advanced societies, to contrive ever new 
methods of production and organization. The dynamic effects 
are given pointed emphasis in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s 
new book, The American Challenge. I can only take time to 
recommend it to your attention. I can not take all the time that 
would be required to cover the enormous important implications 
of the book as it relates the way in which modern education 
has surpassed even the importance of natural resources and 
the importance of the investment process as a factor in the 
momentum of development of contemporary societies. The data 
which he adduces open up a prospect of an ever-widening gap 
between the rate of performance and the level of economic 
benefit of the most successful societies and those of the lag­
gard societies in the contemporary world. The gap between 
the successful and the less successful societies is all too likely 
to become wider and wider as the future unfolds.
IV. Technology of war and weaponry
I do not wish to dwell on these speculative considerations, 
however. I do wish to stress the effects of contemporary tech­
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nology on weapons. As you know, the course of battle in World 
War I was largely determ ined by the advantage accruing to 
the tactical defensive as a result of the state of weapon tech­
nology at that time. In World War II the state of weapon 
technology shifted the advantage to the offensive. In the 
closing stage of that war the power of the offensive was pushed 
right through the top of the graph by the tapping of nuclear 
energy as a means of destructive power in war. Also in that 
war and since, there were prodigious developments in respect 
of lengthening the radius of attack. The consequence of these 
combined developments is to bring the whole world within 
the compass of one strategic theater. The prodigious weapons 
of our time are continuously ready for instant use. The nations 
with enough economic resources to be able to afford these new 
weapons systems are, so to speak, continually in a state of 
mobilization. The launching of an attack of enormous magnitude 
against an adversary is an ever instant possibility. Yet it is 
a tra it of these weapons that they cannot be used to fend off 
an attack. In this respect they differ vitally from the major 
weapons systems of preceding epochs. Battleships and army 
divisions were susceptible of being used to defend one’s own 
perim eter as well as for impinging upon an enemy’s perimeter, 
but this is not the case with the prodigious weapons of our 
time. The concept of a deterrence — that is, forefending against 
attack by having in place a retaliatory capability so great as to 
be able to destroy the enemy even if one’s own establishment 
is destroyed first — carries strategic thought into a new 
dimension.
Along with their destructive potential, one must also take 
account of the strategic limitations of the prodigious weapons. 
They have become so powerful that they scarcely can be 
factored into any rational calculation for waging war. The only 
strategic mission that can plausibly be assigned to them is 
that of countervailing and neutralizing similar weapons disposed 
by an adversary. I emphasize this point. Several times since 
my arrival in South Africa I have been pressed with questions 
as to why the United States has not brought its nuclear 
weaponry to bear to achieve some policy objective or another. 
It is im portant to keep in mind the limitations on the utility of 
nuclear weapon systems. It is necessary for the United States 
to maintain them lest some determining advantage should ac­
92
crue to its adversaries, but that negative purpose sums up 
the benefits.
Here again I should stress the dynamic effect of invention. 
According to a widely prevalent idea all processes have been 
accelerated in contemporary times. The idea is an exaggeration. 
To the contrary, some processes have been lengthened and 
retarded as a direct result of the speeding-up of others. The 
celerity characteristic of modern means of attack has a con­
comitant in the lengthening of the time required for producing 
a new system of weaponry. Invention becomes the mother of 
necessity. The leading military powers are pressed to move 
ahead with ever new weapon systems lest some determinative 
advantage should accrue to the other side. The power to forge 
ahead in the technology of war has become a basic element in 
strategic calculations.
*  * *
With all these manifold changes, a longing for the realiza­
tion of a dependable order encompassing the globe — an up- 
to-date and more enduring prototype of the order which charac­
terized the nineteenth century — persists widely. It is a spe­
culative question whether such an order can be realized again 
within the calculable future. I take account of the many 
recurring predictions that mankind as a whole will soon succeed 
in relegating warfare to the unhappy past and therewith enter 
upon an unprecedented era of general peace. I see no empirical 
evidence to sustain this high hope. I am not predicting that the 
hope will be frustrated. I am simply disclaiming any reason for 
feeling assured of its success.
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